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Abstract 
 
Technical analysis involves the prediction of future exchange rate (or other asset-
price) movements from an inductive analysis of past movements. A reading of the 
large literature on this topic allows us to establish a set of stylised facts, including the 
facts that technical analysis is an important and widely used method of analysis in the 
foreign exchange market and that applying certain technical trading rules over a 
sustained period may lead to significant positive excess returns. We then analyze four 
arguments that have been put forward to explain the continuing widespread use of 
technical analysis and its apparent profitability: that the foreign exchange market may 
be characterised by not-fully-rational behaviour; that technical analysis may exploit 
the influence of central bank interventions; that technical analysis may be an efficient 
form of information processing; and finally that it may provide information on non-
fundamental influences on foreign exchange movements. Although all of these 
positions may be relevant to some degree, neither non-rationality nor official 
interventions seem to be widespread and persistent enough to explain the obstinate 
passion of foreign exchange professionals for technical analysis.  
 
JEL-Classification: F 31 
Keywords: foreign exchange market, technical analysis, market microstructure 
 
*The authors are grateful to Carol Osler, Stephan Schulmeister and Yin-Wong 
Cheung for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. Menkhoff gratefully 
acknowledges financial support from the German Research Foundation (Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft DFG). 
 
October 17, 2006 
 
Lukas Menkhoff    Mark P. Taylor 
Department of Economics   Department of Economics  
University of Hannover   University of Warwick 
Koenigsworther Platz 1   Coventry CV4 7AL, UK 
D-30167 Hannover, Germany  Mark.Taylor@warwick.ac.uk 
menkhoff@gif.uni-hannover.de 
 2 
“As for the foreign exchange, it is almost as romantic as young love, and quite as 
resistant to formulae.” 
— H. L. Mencken 
 
 
1 Introduction 
Technical analysis involves the prediction of future exchange rate (or other asset-
price) movements from an inductive analysis of past movements, using either 
qualitative methods (e.g. the recognition of certain patterns in the data for visual 
inspection of a time-series plot) or quantitative techniques (e.g. based on an analysis 
of moving averages), or a combination of both. For professional economists, the 
widespread, continuing use of these techniques in the foreign exchange market 
(Taylor and Allen, 1992; Cheung and Chinn, 2001) is somewhat puzzling, since 
technical analysis eschews scrutiny of economic fundamentals and relies only on 
information on past exchange rate movements that, according to the weakest notion of 
market efficiency, should already be embedded in the current exchange rate, making 
its use either unprofitable or implying that any positive returns that are generated are 
accompanied by an unacceptable risk exposure.1 On the other hand, despite an 
apparent emerging consensus that fundamentals such as relative prices or relative 
monetary velocity are capable of explaining very long-term exchange rate movements 
(Taylor and Taylor, 2004), there is still no fundamentals-based exchange rate model 
available that is capable of forecasting exchange rate behaviour over the shorter term 
(e.g. over a horizon of twelve months or less: Frankel and Rose, 1995; Taylor, 1995). 
Hence, the suggestion of Malkiel (1996), that “Technical strategies are usually 
amusing, often comforting, but of no real value” is perhaps a little too dismissive, and 
this has been recognised by a number of researchers.2 Indeed, over the past twenty 
years or so, international financial economists have increasingly turned their attention 
to the study of technical analysis in an attempt to understand both the behaviour of 
foreign exchange rates and the behaviour of foreign exchange market participants; so 
much so, in fact, that quite an extensive literature has developed on this topic. 
Although the literature on the application of technical analysis to the foreign 
exchange market is sufficiently developed to warrant a survey of its own, however, 
the foreign exchange market cannot be viewed in total isolation from other financial 
                                                 
1 In other words, the ratio of expected return to risk (the volatility of returns) is unacceptably low. 
2 As we discuss in more detail below, Malkiel’s dismissive treatment of technical analysis is at odds 
with the evidence that technical analysis is widely used by financial market traders. 
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markets, and so we occasionally stray into the literature on the application of technical 
analysis to financial markets more generally and to equity markets in particular. The 
foreign exchange market differs from equity markets in some important aspects, 
however. First, total turnover in the global foreign exchange market is very high, at 
some 2,000 billion US dollars per day (Bank for International Settlements, 2005), 
which is several times greater than the combined daily turnover of the largest stock 
exchanges in the world.3 Second, foreign exchange markets consist almost entirely of 
professional traders (Sager and Taylor, 2006), so that the impact of individual private 
investors may be neglected without loss of generality (in contrast to equity markets—
see, e.g., Griffin, Harris and Topaloglu, 2003). Third, the share of short-term 
interdealer trading is much higher in the foreign exchange market than it is in stock 
markets (Lyons, 2001). Finally, one can probably say that there is less confidence 
among traders in models of fair value in the foreign exchange market compared to 
equity markets (Frankel and Rose, 1995; Taylor, 1995; Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay, 
1996). The greater lack of consensus in models of fair value in the foreign exchange 
market and the greater concentration on shorter trading horizons might suggest that 
the use of technical analysis would be more popular in the foreign exchange market, 
although the high proportion of professional traders and deeper liquidity of the foreign 
exchange market might suggest the opposite. However, we do not want to dwell too 
long on the differences between the foreign exchange market and equity markets, but 
rather emphasise the fact that foreign exchange is increasingly seen as a separate asset 
class (Snyder, 2005). 
In this paper, we provide a selective and critical overview of the literature on 
technical analysis in the foreign exchange market. At the forefront of our discussion 
throughout is the question as to why technical currency analysis is so intensively and 
widely used by foreign exchange professionals. As an organising device, we develop 
a set of stylized facts concerning the importance and profitability of technical 
                                                 
3 Comparing spot market turnover yields a ratio of about three in favour of the foreign exchange market 
compared to equities. We calculate this by taking daily spot trading in equities and currencies in 2004-5 
in the seven largest asset trading centres in the world. For equities these were the New York Stock 
Exchange, Nasdaq, the London Stock Exchange, the Tokyo Stock Exchange, Euronext (Paris, Brussels, 
Amsterdam, Lisbon), the Deutsche Börse (Frankfurt) and the Bolsas y Mercados Españoles (Spain) 
(see the website www.world-exchanges.org), while for foreign exchange the major centres were 
London, New York, Tokyo, Singapore, Frankfurt, Hong Kong and Sydney (Bank for International 
Settlements, 2005). In these centres, daily spot market turnover was about 480 billion US dollars in 
foreign exchange versus 160 billion US dollars in equities; both figures represent more than 75 percent 
of the respective world markets. 
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currency analysis. We then offer four different kinds of explanation for the persistent 
use of technical analysis and analyze the supporting evidence in each case.  
 
2 The nature of technical analysis 
Technical analysis or, as it also sometimes called, “chartist analysis” is a set of 
techniques for deriving forecasts of financial prices exclusively by analyzing the 
history of the particular price series plus perhaps transactions volumes.4, 5 This 
analysis can be performed in a qualitative form, relying mainly on the analysis of 
charts of past price behaviour and loose inductive reasoning, or it can be strictly 
quantitative, by constructing trading signals or forecasts through a quantitative 
analysis of time series data. In practice, technical analysts employ a combination of 
both qualitative and quantitative techniques. 
Clearly, technical analysis assumes that price developments display regular, 
recurring patterns, otherwise such a purely inductive technique would be useless. A 
second condition for the profitability of technical analysis is that these patterns must 
last long enough, first to be recognized, and second to make up for transaction costs 
and false signals. 
The more qualitative aspect of technical analysis involves recognising patterns 
in the data that are thought to herald trend reversals, such as “flags”, “head and 
shoulders” patterns, and so on (see e.g. Allen and Taylor, 1992).  
The more widely used quantitative forms of technical analysis generally 
involve methods such as moving averages in order to exploit trends in the data. They 
thus attempt to distinguish trends from noise, i.e. fluctuations around a trend, by 
smoothing currency returns. 
A simple moving average rule would signal an imminent break in trend, or the 
emergence of a new trend, when the moving average is crossed by the spot rate or by 
a shorter moving average. Thus, an imminent upward break in trend for the spot rate, 
st, might be signalled by a short moving average of length m>1, MAt(m), intersecting 
from below a longer moving average of length n (n>m), MAt(n), i.e. 
                                                 
4 In this paper, we use the terms “technical analysis” and “chartist analysis “and their derivatives 
largely as synonyms. This usage is not universal, although it is not unusual among practitioners (see 
e.g. Henderson, 2002) and has some precedence in the academic literature (e.g. Goodhart, 1988; 
Frankel and Froot, 1990; Taylor and Allen, 1992). It should be noted, however, that some practitioners 
and some authors differentiate “chartist analysis” as denoting the use of largely visual analysis of charts 
and therefore see it as a subset of the methods denoted by “technical analysis” (see, e.g., Neely, 1997). 
5 See Allen and Taylor (1992) for an outline of the origins of technical analysis. 
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Conversely, a downward break in trend would be signalled by the short moving 
average crossing the long moving average from above.6 Indicators of this kind will 
tend to be profitable in markets exhibiting definite trends and so they are generically 
known as “trend-following” or “momentum” indicators.   
Another widely used device is the “overbought/oversold” indicator, or 
oscillator. Oscillators are measures designed to indicate that price movements in a 
particular direction have recently been too rapid and that a correction in the opposite 
direction is imminent; they may take a number of precise forms. One popular form is 
the relative strength indicator (RSI; Wilder, 1978), for example, which is defined as: 
 
tt
t
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where Ut denotes the cumulated “up movement” (i.e. the close-to-close increase on a 
day when the exchange rate has closed higher than the previous day’s closing rate) 
over a certain period, and Dt denotes the cumulated absolute “down movement” (the 
absolute close-to-close decrease on a day when the exchange rate has closed lower 
than the previous day’s closing rate) over the same period (often fourteen days):7  
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6 A variant would be to use exponential moving averages rather than simple arithmetic moving 
averages. Also, analysts may smooth the data prior to any analysis by applying very short-run (e.g. 
one-day) moving averages or exponential moving averages to the data, in order to reduce the effect of 
noise on trading signals. 
7 Some expositions define Ut and Dt in terms of average rather than cumulated up and down 
movements.  This is equivalent to our definition, however, since it just involves dividing by the total 
number of days and this factor cancels out when the RSI is calculated. 
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(where (.)ι  is an indicator variable that takes the value one when the statement in 
parentheses is true, and zero otherwise).8 The RSI thus attempts to measure the 
strength of “up movements” relative to the strength of “down movements”, and is 
normalised to lie between 0 and 100; common values at which a particular currency is 
deemed to have been overbought (signalling an imminent downward correction) or 
oversold (signalling an imminent upward correction) are 70 and 30, respectively (see, 
e.g. Henderson, 2002). Indicators of this kind are also referred to as “reversal” 
indicators, since they are designed to anticipate a reversal in trend. 
A third standard quantitative technique of technical analysis, the filter rule, 
involves buying  a currency against another currency whenever the exchange rate has 
risen by more than a given percentage above its most recent low and selling it when 
the rate drops by more than the same percentage below its most recent high. An x-
percent filter rule may be expressed thus:9 
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Obviously, the variety of both qualitative and quantitative techniques varies 
enormously—a fact which makes it quite difficult to provide a systematic assessment 
of technical analysis. Moreover, empirical tests of specific rules and their associated 
trading signals are not fully satisfactory as tests of the efficacy of technical analysis 
more generally, since users typically do not apply a single rule but rather a range of 
                                                 
8 The RSI is sometimes equivalently defined as ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
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RSI
1
1100100 , where RS, or “relative 
strength”, is defined as ttt DURS /≡ . 
9 Note that the ‘min’ conditions in these filter-rule formulae minimise with respect to the time period 
rather than the exchange rate, so that they find the most recent period when the conditions indicated are 
met. For example, the formula for the buy signal may be expressed thus: “Starting at time t, find the 
most recent period in which the exchange rate was less than it is at time t but where it had been falling 
compared to the previous period (i.e. the exchange rate’s most recent low) and if the exchange rate has 
risen by more than x percent since then and time t, buy.” The non-negativity condition on the i 
subscripts is to ensure that the formulae apply to lags rather than leads. (Naturally, it is understood that 
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technical indicators which they update on a non-regular basis. In addition, many 
technical analysts will also apply considerable market intuition to complement their 
quantitative conclusions, so there remains always a major element of subjectivity with 
the application of technical analysis. 
 
3 The importance of technical analysis in the foreign exchange market 
The widespread use of technical analysis by foreign exchange professionals was first 
brought to the attention of academic researchers by Goodman (1979), Group of Thirty 
(1985), Frankel and Froot (1986, 1990a, 1990b) and Goodhart (1988).10 However, the 
existence of technical analysis and even its use did not provoke sustained academic 
interest as long as the available evidence was not of a more systematic nature. The 
scepticism with which academic economists initially viewed (and to some extent 
continue to view) technical analysis was derived largely from the intellectual standing 
of the efficient markets hypothesis (EMH), which, even in its ‘weak form’ (Fama, 
1970), maintains that all relevant information should already be embodied in asset 
prices, making it impossible to earn excess returns on forecasts based on historical 
price movements, once suitable risk-adjustment is made.11 
Nevertheless, during the 1990s, beginning with the work of Allen and Taylor 
(1990), a number of academic studies appeared that reported the results of surveys of 
foreign exchange market participants concerning the use of technical analysis. The 
salient characteristics of these studies—in terms of survey year, target group, response 
rate, location, etc.—are given in Table 1. The first survey, discussed in Allen and 
Taylor (1990) and Taylor and Allen (1992), was carried out among chief foreign 
exchange dealers at financial institutions located in London in 1988; the most recent 
was conducted in 2001 by Gehrig and Menkhoff (2004) among foreign exchange 
dealers and fund managers located in Germany. In all, the various surveys have 
covered foreign exchange professionals based in London, Frankfurt, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Tokyo, New York and Zurich. In 1995—the mid-point between the 
earliest and latest studies—the Bank for International Settlements (2005) ranked the 
seven locations covered by the survey studies as first to seventh in terms of daily 
                                                                                                                                            
“buy” means “buy the currency whose price in terms of the second currency is represented by the 
exchange rate in question”, and “sell” is to be interpreted similarly.) 
10 The early study of technical analysis in the foreign exchange market of Poole (1967) can be seen as 
very much ahead of its time. 
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turnover in foreign exchange dealing, making up about 78% of the total global 
turnover; the combined market share of these centres was virtually unchanged until 
2004. Although the response rates of the studies differ markedly, the results are 
remarkably invariant. 
The studies of Allen and Taylor (1990) and Taylor and Allen (1992) 
documented for the first time systematically that technical analysis is, indeed, an 
important tool in decision making in the foreign exchange market. They further 
established a perceived complementarity among market practitioners in the use of 
technical and fundamental analysis, and showed that reliance on technical analysis 
was skewed towards shorter trading or forecast horizons. These three basic findings 
are also features of the results reported in the remaining six survey studies (see Table 
2), and therefore form the first three of our stylised facts—SF1, SF2 and SF3: 
 
Stylised Fact 1 (SF1):  Almost all foreign exchange professionals use technical 
analysis as a tool in decision making at least to some degree. 
Stylised Fact 2 (SF2):  Most foreign exchange professionals use some combination of 
technical analysis and fundamental analysis. 
Stylised Fact 3 (SF3):  The relative weight given to technical analysis as opposed to 
fundamental analysis rises as the trading or forecast horizon declines.  
 
SF1 can be established from the third column in Table 2. Those surveys which asked 
respondents whether or not they used technical analysis at some horizon found that 
around 90% or more did so. The fact that practitioners use technical analysis does not 
by itself, however, establish that they regard it as of major importance—they may 
attach some weight to it, but only a low weight. Although not identical in design, most 
of the surveys therefore also asked respondents to quantify the weight given to 
technical analysis relative to fundamental analysis at various horizons (SF2); the 
average relative weight assigned to technical analysis is shown in column five of 
Table 2, and ranges from around 30 percent to a little over 50 percent. 
A further aspect of the importance of technical analysis concerns its use 
among various groups of market participants, since a high average score could mask 
its concentration in small subgroups in the market. Table 3 reveals, however, that 
                                                                                                                                            
11 The more extreme form of the EMH assumes that agents are risk neutral so that significantly non-
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technical analysis is perceived as important relative to fundamentals across a range of 
practitioner groups such as chief foreign exchange dealers, international portfolio 
managers and others, whatever their specific role in foreign exchange trading may 
be.12 
Early analytical studies of the foreign exchange market that allocated a role to 
technical analysts or chartists tended to view chartists and fundamentalists as 
competing factions, either in their own right as traders or as advisers to traders 
(Goodhart, 1988; Frankel and Froot, 1990, 1990a). SF2, however, (“Most foreign 
exchange professionals use some combination of technical analysis and fundamental 
analysis”) challenges this adversarial view of chartism and fundamentalism. Figure 1 
demonstrates that other studies have basically reproduced this finding of perceived 
complementarity (i.e. a reliance on fundamental and technical analysis) established by 
Taylor and Allen (1992). In particular, the weight given to strong mutual 
exclusiveness of chartism and fundamentalism, i.e. a reliance on either fundamental 
or technical analysis (represented in Figure 1 by values 9 and 10), is at most ten 
percent of respondents in all studies. 
Finally, SF3 states that technical analysis tends to be perceived as less 
important at longer horizons in comparison with fundamental analysis (see explicitly 
Taylor and Allen, 1992, Table 3B). A graphical presentation of the research regarding 
SF3 can be seen from the work of Taylor and Allen (1992), Lui and Mole (1998) and 
Oberlechner (2001) in Figure 2A. These three studies relate the perceived relative 
importance of technical and fundamental analysis with forecast or trading horizon. If 
one takes, however, the other studies—featured in Figure 2B—into account, the result 
remains unchanged for the medium and longer horizons but becomes less clear for the 
very short horizon. There is, however, an obvious reason for this apparent difference 
in perceived relative importance at the very short horizon, in terms of their coverage 
of analytical tools or price-determining factors. In particular, studies featured in 
Figure 2B also take into account other factors such as the perceived importance 
attached by market practitioners to information on order flow (i.e. on information 
                                                                                                                                            
zero excess returns cannot be earned. 
12 Overall foreign exchange trading operations will be headed by a chief dealer who is, however, due to 
his management role, not necessarily the most active trader. Then there will be core traders, such as 
those responsible for spot trades in a given exchange rate, and finally there are other foreign exchange 
traders who may focus on further objectives such as trading forwards and futures, or are junior and thus 
have less leeway in their decision making. See Sager and Taylor (2006) for a comprehensive analysis 
of the structure of the foreign exchange market. 
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relating to the value of foreign exchange transactions signed according to the 
originator of the trade—see e.g. Ito, Lyons and Melvin, 1998; Lyons, 2001; Sarno and 
Taylor, 2001; Evans and Lyons, 2002). The inclusion of factors other than technical 
and fundamental analysis in the menu of choices offered to survey participants thus 
dilutes the relative score given to technical analysis in the shorter-term domain (see 
on these factors columns two and four in Table 2).13 Considering only fundamental 
and technical analysis for the purpose of comparison, indeed reproduces the earlier 
finding in Figure 2C (also supported by Gehrig and Menkhoff, 2006, with a different 
methodology). 
As a final remark it may be reassuring that the stylised facts shown for foreign 
exchange dealers and fund managers from the main financial centres by and large also 
hold for financial journalists (Oberlechner, 2001) and dealers in an emerging market 
(Bhanumurthy, 2004). 
 
4 Profitability of technical analysis: measures and results 
The evidence concerning the profitability of technical currency analysis tends to be 
inconclusive. From a theoretical point of view, this is perhaps unsurprising, since if 
technical analysis was never profitable, its widespread use (see Section 2) would be 
hard to understand; if, on the other hand, technical analysis was always profitable, it 
would perhaps imply that the foreign exchange market is inefficient to a degree that 
many economists would not find credible. 
Indeed, the EMH does not imply in this respect that returns to applying a 
technical trading strategy have to be zero. Rather, efficient markets “rule out the 
possibility of trading systems based only on [current and past] information [having] 
expected profits or returns in excess of equilibrium expected profits or returns” 
(Fama, 1970, p.385). In this context, equilibrium expected returns must be calculated 
after allowing for a reasonable return to risk and after allowance for transactions 
costs.14  
                                                 
13 It is possible that order flow might better be interpreted as fundamental rather than as technical 
information since, although it is clearly not on the list of standard macroeconomic fundamentals, it may 
in some sense embody the net effect of fundamental influences on the foreign exchange market (Lyons, 
2001; Evans and Lyons, 2005b). Nevertheless, we rely here on studies in which order flow forms a 
third category and which may to some extent represent the current perception of order flow by foreign 
exchange professionals (Henderson, 2002; Gehrig and Menkhoff, 2004). 
14 It may also allow for tax payments, where tax treatment differs across investor groups. 
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In assessing the profitability of technical analysis, therefore, three 
methodological aspects have to be addressed carefully. First, any examination should 
define appropriate alternatives, i.e. on the one hand the technical analysis strategies 
and on the other hand a strategy relying on the EMH. Important features of this 
comparison must include transaction costs and interest rate carry costs.15 
Second, the issue of statistical significance has to be tackled. Independently of 
the distribution of exchange rate returns, there must always exist a technical analysis 
strategy that is able to exploit characteristics of the time series in any particular 
sample. Thus, it is not profitability per se that is interesting but the possible 
significance of the result that challenges the EMH. 
Third, it is probably the form of risk consideration—an essential element of 
Fama’s “equilibrium expected profits”—that divides advocates and opponents of 
technical analysis in the interpretation of their empirical work. 
If one compares the overview of earlier studies in Table 4 with the three 
requirements just mentioned, it becomes clear that these studies are all characterized 
by shortcomings to a greater or lesser extent: many of them examine only one 
currency, some do not consider all kinds of costs and most are handicapped by a short 
period of investigation which does not allow for appropriate out-of-sample 
calculations. Thus, only the studies of Dooley and Shafer (1983) and Sweeney (1986) 
have been consistently cited in the literature (see e.g. Gencay, 1999; LeBaron, 1999; 
Neely, 2002; Olson, 2004). 
It is interesting to note that most of the stylized facts that can be drawn from 
profitability examinations are already found in this early literature (Table 4) and that 
they are supported by later studies (e.g. Surajas and Sweeney, 1992; Menkhoff and 
Schlumberger, 1995; Pilbeam, 1995; Neely, 1997; LeBaron, 1999; Saacke, 2002). 
They can be gathered together here as Stylised Facts 4, 5 and 6: 
 
Stylised Fact 4 (SF4):  The consideration of transaction costs and interest rate costs 
actually faced by professionals does not necessarily eliminate the profitability of 
technical currency analysis. 
                                                 
15 It must also constitute a study of profitability from an ex ante rather than an ex post perspective, so 
that there is perceived gain from gathering and utilising information in a superior fashion (Grossman 
and Stiglitz, 1980). 
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Stylised Fact 5 (SF5):  Technical analysis tends to be more profitable with volatile 
currencies. 
Stylised Fact 6 (SF6):  The performance of technical trading rules are highly 
unstable over time. 
 
Evidence on SF4—the profitability of technical trading rules after allowance for 
transactions costs and interest rate carry—is provided by, among others, Cornell and 
Dietrich (1978), Sweeney (1986), Schulmeister (1987), LeBaron (1999), Saacke 
(2002) and Neely, Weller and Ulrich (2006). Studies supporting the hypothesis that 
technical trading rules are more profitable for currencies experiencing relatively 
higher volatility (SF5) include Cornell and Dietrich (1978), Dooley and Shafer 
(1983), Lee and Mathur (1996) and Neely and Weller (1999). Work suggesting that 
technical trading rule performance is unstable over time (SF6) include Logue, 
Sweeney and Willett (1978), Dooley and Shafer (1983), Menkhoff and Schlumberger 
(1995), LeBaron (2000), Dueker and Neely (2005) and Neely, Weller and Ulrich 
(2006).16 
The rapidly growing empirical literature on the profitability of technical 
analysis in the foreign exchange market that has appeared since the late 1990s has, if 
anything, further substantiated these older stylized facts (see, e.g., Park and Irwin, 
2005). In addition, it is possible to discern a number of developments among the more 
recent literature. 
First, a major methodological innovation has been the introduction of the 
bootstrap approach addressing the problem of insignificant evidence (Levich and 
Thomas, 1993; LeBaron, 1999, 2000; Osler, 2000, 2003) and, more recently, the 
introduction of methods for testing for potential data-snooping bias (Park and Irwin, 
2005; Qi and Wu, 2006). 
Second, the range of technical analysis tools and trading rules considered has 
been increased far beyond filter rules, moving averages or point-and-figure indicators, 
and now includes the possible psychological barriers of round figures, the closely 
                                                 
16 As an anonymous referee has pointed out, the evidence for the instability of technical trading rules 
should be interpreted with care, however, since exchange rate returns are noisy relative to sample 
length, tests for unknown structural breaks have notoriously low power and test for structural breaks at 
known breakpoints are subject to data snooping bias. Moreover, the popularity of technical analysis 
may be sustained not by its consistent performance but by its perceived performance across various 
prominent episodes and instability in performance over time is also a characteristic of fundamentals-
based exchange rate models (Cheung, Chinn and Garcia Pascual, 2005). 
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related issue of support and resistance levels (De Grauwe and Decupere, 1992; Curcio 
and Goodhart, 1992; Osler, 2000, 2003, 2005) or of momentum-based strategies 
(Okunev and White, 2003).17 
Third, the longer span of data available for the floating rate period since the 
early 1970s has stimulated the question as to whether profits from technical analysis 
are declining over time. There is indeed evidence that the foreign exchange market 
has become more efficient over time in the sense that the application of traditional 
moving average rules, that was shown to be profitable for the 1970s (e.g. Logue and 
Sweeney, 1977; Cornell and Dietrich, 1978; Dooley and Shafer, 1983; Sweeney, 
1986), became much less profitable in the 1990s (LeBaron, 2000; Olson, 2004), even 
after allowing for a reduction in transactions costs over time (Neely, Weller and 
Ulrich, 2006). Although significant evidence of profitability—albeit on a reduced 
level—remains and may even have been increasing during recent years in euro-dollar 
trading (Park and Irwin, 2005; Schulmeister, 2005). Also, there may be more complex 
forms of technical analysis that did not become less profitable over time (e.g. Okunev 
and White, 2003; Neely, Weller and Ulrich, 2006).18 
Fourth, there have been attempts to avoid potential selection bias by letting 
actors state their preferred rules prior to any profitability analysis (Allen and Taylor, 
1990; Curcio and Goodhart, 1992, 1993; Osler, 2000). 
Fifth, studies have explored the relation between non-linear exchange rate 
modelling and technical analysis (Clyde and Osler, 1997; Fiess and MacDonald, 
1999; Kilian and Taylor, 2003; De Grauwe and Grimaldi, 2006, 2006a; Reitz and 
Taylor, 2006). 
Sixth, stimulated by the apparent success of longer-term exchange rate 
modelling via a Markov switching approach (Engel and Hamilton, 1990), studies have 
found some links between regime switches and technical trading rules (Dewachter, 
1997, 2001; Vigfusson, 1997). However, profitability does not seem to be better than 
for simple moving average rules (Dueker and Neely, 2005) although an advantage 
                                                 
17 The technical trading rules that have been examined in this literature include those based on head and 
shoulders patterns (Chang and Osler, 1999; Lucke, 2003), candlestick formations (Fiess and 
MacDonald, 2002), neural networks (Gencay, 1999), genetic programming (Neely, Weller and Dittmar, 
1997; Neely and Weller, 1999, 2001), Markov switching models (Marsh, 2000; Dueker and Neely, 
2005) and real-time trading models (Gencay et al., 2003). 
18 Similar results are reported by Hsu and Kuan (2005) for stock markets, providing support to the 
interpretation of Neely, Weller and Ulrich (2006) that markets may need time to become aware of and 
then to arbitrage away profit opportunities generated by technical trading rules. 
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may be gained by the fact that profits remain more stable over time (Neely, Weller 
and Ulrich, 2006). 
Finally, some studies (Curcio et al., 1997; Osler, 2000, 2003; Neely and 
Weller, 2003; Kozhan and Salmon, 2006) have examined the profitability of technical 
analysis on a very high-freqency (intra-day) basis, with mixed results. 
On balance, however, the literature on the profitability of technical trading 
rules tends to support the existence of significant profits to be had by employing these 
rules in the foreign exchange market (see also Park and Irwin, 2004). Of course, this 
in itself raises a sample selection bias issue, since it is well known that positive results 
are generally much easier to report than negative results. In particular, these studies 
may be subject to “data snooping” (White, 2000). Data snooping occurs when a given 
set of data is used more than once for purposes of inference or model selection, so that 
the possibility arises that any satisfactory results obtained may simply be due to 
chance rather than to any merit or skill inherent in the method yielding the good 
results. White (2000) develops a bootstrap simulation technique—the “reality 
check”—for examining whether it is inherent skill or pure chance that leads to the 
best rule being chosen out of any given universe of rules. Intuitively, a reality check 
involves replicating, by Monte Carlo methods, many artificial data sets that in some 
sense match the properties of the original data sets, and testing the various trading 
rules for profitability on each data set. If there is a tendency for the same rule to be 
selected as the most profitable for each data set, then this suggest that it really is a 
good rule; if there is no tendency to select that particular rule for each of the artificial 
data sets, then this indicates that it was selected as the most profitable rule in the 
original data set purely by chance.19 
                                                 
19 An anonymous referee has pointed out a number of issues that may be raised with respect to White’s 
reality check. In particular, while the reality check is clearly an improvement over earlier approaches 
that ignored data-snooping bias, the group of trading rules making up the universe within which the 
reality check is carried out must still be chosen and that brings back the danger of data snooping in a 
different guise. Indeed, there may even be a systematic bias involved as researchers may, consciously 
or unconsciously, rely on rules that have been implicitly tested on similar data in previous research. 
Moreover, merely adding a large number of poor rules into the reality check universe will tend to raise 
the critical values for a given nominal test size while the performance of the benchmark trading rule 
does not change. An alternative approach would be to carry out an ex ante search for profitable trading 
rules using artificial intelligence such as a genetic algorithm that “learns” trading rules and applies 
them, as in the equity-market study of Allen and Karjalainen (1999), although this approach would also 
potentially be subject to sample-selection bias. Alternatively, one can perform true out-of-sample tests 
by retesting rules that have found to be profitable in earlier studies—as for example in LeBaron (2000) 
or Neely, Weller and Ulrich (2006). 
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The first application of White’s reality check to technical trading rules in the 
foreign exchange market is due to Qi and Wu (2006). These authors examine a large 
number of technical trading rules and apply them to daily data on seven dollar 
exchange rates over the period 1973-1998. The technical rules are various calibrations 
of four classes of rules: filter rules (buy or sell a currency if it moves more than a 
certain percent from its most recent high or low); moving average rules (as discussed 
above); support and resistance rules (buy or sell a currency when it breaks above or 
below the maximum or minimum level, the resistance level, over a stipulated recent 
period); and channel breakout rules (but or sell a currency when it breaks out of a 
channel, defined as occurring when the high price of a foreign currency over the 
previous n days is within x percent of the low over the previous n days). Using 
standard tests, Qi and Wu’s results indicate significant profitability of moving average 
and channel breakout rules for seven dollar exchange rates. They then apply White’s 
(2000) reality check bootstrap methodology to evaluate these rules and to characterize 
the effects of potential data-snooping biases. They find significant profitability at the 
one percent level for all seven currencies even, after data-snooping biases (as well as 
transactions costs) are properly taken into account (Park and Irwin, 2005, find a 
similar result for euro and yen futures). Moreover, employing the Japanese yen or the 
German mark as a vehicle currency (instead of the US dollar) yields even stronger 
results.  
Even if the existence of significantly profitable technical trading rules can be 
established, however, there is still the possibility that all that is being measured is a 
risk premium, so that the risk-adjusted returns from the rule would on average be non-
positive. Table 4 revealed already that earlier studies usually ignored this issue but 
more recent studies have elaborated on it (see Table 5). The pioneering attempt in this 
respect is Cornell and Dietrich (1978) who suggest a risk adjustment according to the 
international capital asset pricing model (ICAPM). Their empirical realization is 
limited, however, by practical constraints: first, the world portfolio is proxied by a US 
market stock index (the S&P 500) and, second, they generally calculate the beta of 
foreign currencies with this index rather than the beta of currency positions that result 
from technical trading rules (for the latter see e.g. Taylor, 1992, with the same 
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result).20 Nevertheless, their very low beta estimates suggest that investing in foreign 
currency provides a good hedge for an investor whose portfolio is primarily centred 
on US stocks (see also Neely, 1997). 
The first study systematically integrating risk-adjustment into the empirical 
examination of certain rules, however, was due to Sweeney (1986). This study 
characterizes a quite different approach to that of Cornell and Dietrich (1978), as it 
compares trading rules based on technical currency analysis rules to buy-and-hold 
strategies. If, for example, deviations from uncovered interest rate parity (the 
condition that the expected excess return, net of interest rate carry, from buying and 
holding foreign currency should be zero) simply represent risk premia, then a possible 
implication is that apparently profitable technical trading rules are simply picking up 
these risk premia. Sweeney indeed calibrated his work under the assumption of a 
constant risk premium, i.e. the average return on foreign exchange holdings is 
adjusted by the foreign-domestic interest rate differential. Then the excess return on 
following the technical analysis rule, i.e. gross return minus return from buy-and-
hold, is adjusted by the share of days that the trading rule is invested in foreign 
currency and has thus to earn a risk premium. According to this procedure, Sweeney 
did not find a risk-based explanation for excess returns. Levich and Thomas (1993), 
applying a similar methodology, found a similar result. 
However, these results may be questioned on at least two grounds. First, it is 
not clear why one should expect a positive risk premium for investing in one currency 
in a bilateral exchange rate as this implies that investment in the second currency (or a 
short position in the first currency) earns a negative risk premium.21 Second, the 
assumption of a constant foreign exchange risk premium is not a very realistic one 
(Taylor, 1995). The first study to relax this assumption in the context of technical 
trading rules was Taylor (1992), who allows for a time-varying risk premium in the 
form of a first-order autoregressive process. Parameter values of this process, justified 
by results from other studies, are used to enter into a pricing model. For several 
combinations of parameter values, hundreds of time series are then simulated on 
which technical analysis rules are evaluated. It is found that there does not seem to be 
a reasonable constellation of parameters for the time-varying risk premium which 
                                                 
20 From today’s perspective, the choice of a US portfolio may seem less of a shortcoming, taking 
account of the well-documented preference of investors for home assets (Lewis, 1999). 
21 We thank two of the anonymous referees for encouraging us to make this argument. 
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would be needed to explain observed returns as a compensation for risk (see also 
Okunev and White, 2003). On the other hand, all that this evidence may be revealing 
is that the wrong parameterisation of the risk premium was assumed. 
A much more extensive approach in deriving time-varying foreign exchange 
risk premia in this context is adopted by Kho (1996). He relates possible excess 
returns to a world stock portfolio (the MSCI index) in a conditional ICAPM 
framework. Within his framework, there are basically three factors which are assumed 
to determine world excess returns: interest rate differentials against the US dollar, the 
conditional variance of world excess returns and a moving average term. The 
empirical work uses econometric models in which the conditional variance is allowed 
to affect the conditional mean (i.e. GARCH-m models) in order to calculate expected 
risks. Kho finds that much of the technical analysis returns can indeed be explained as 
compensation for the high risks involved. 
The above approaches to incorporate risk into profitability measurement 
implicitly need a benchmark model of asset pricing in equilibrium. Obviously, the 
ICAPM is most popular in this respect although empirical finance may tentatively 
prefer multi-factor models, such as the Fama and French (1996) approach. From a 
theoretical point of view consumption-based asset pricing seems more advantageous 
to the CAPM (Cochrane, 2005). However, neither of these approaches has been 
applied to the foreign exchange market.22 Given the failure in identifying meaningful 
time-varying risk premia in international finance in general (Taylor, 1995), this 
shortcoming may be excusable. This lack of knowledge has, moreover, fuelled other 
ways of addressing the riskiness inherent in the use of technical analysis. 
Some studies circumvent the problem of measuring the world portfolio and 
deriving risk premia. Instead, they directly compare the return-risk-profile of a 
speculative currency portfolio to a benchmark portfolio by using the ratio of 
annualised excess returns (relative to a benchmark strategy) to the standard deviation 
of those returns, i.e. the Sharpe or information ratio (Sharpe, 1966). Alternative 
benchmarks in this respect are either a buy-and-hold currency strategy (e.g. Menkhoff 
and Schlumberger, 1995) or the return from holding a broad portfolio index such as 
the market index (e.g. Neely, 1997; Chang and Osler, 1999; LeBaron, 2000; Saacke, 
                                                 
22 It is interesting to note in this respect that these more advanced approaches are also confronted with 
evidence that questions their explanatory power (Lewellen, Nagel and Shanken, 2006). 
 18 
2002).23 The results of these studies show higher risk-adjusted returns to technical 
analysis rules than to the benchmark portfolios.24 
The popular Sharpe or information ratio (IR) has its own problems, however, 
when it is used as a criterion by which to measure the performance of trading rules. 
Suppose that the mean excess return of the trading rule over a period of T years is α , 
with standard deviation σ. Then the IR will be defined as 
IR ασ≡ . 
Now, it can easily be shown that τ=√T ×IR is approximately equal to a t-ratio for a 
test of the hypothesis that the excess return is zero.25 A common benchmark for a 
“good” trading rule in the finance industry in general is an IR of 0.5 (see, e.g. Grinold 
and Kahn, 2000). But this means that an IR of 0.5 must be sustained over about 
eleven years before the trading rule can be said to have generated excess returns 
significantly greater than zero at the 5 percent significance level, since this would give 
a value of τ (==√11 ×0.5=1.658,) greater than the critical value for a one-sided test at 
the 5 percent level (i.e. 1.645). Suppose that a trader selects a certain rule because it 
has an IR of 0.5 according to a “backtest” with ten or more years of data. As we 
discussed earlier, there is a strong likelihood that the rule will be subject to data-
snooping, and a true out-of-sample test would require that the trader keeps the rule 
and monitors its performance over the ensuing ten or eleven years or so—which is a 
very long time in the financial markets. 
This picture changes, however, if one measures risk not in the traditional sense 
of the variability of returns but if one tries instead to integrate the professionals' 
perception of risk as relating to relative performance in comparison with the market 
(see e.g. Goodhart, 1988, p.457). Here, SF6 comes into play, namely that profitability 
is unstable over time. In summary, applying technical analysis involves a high 
probability of making “wrong” decisions, i.e. performing below the market, at least 
                                                 
23 These alternative benchmarks are second-best solutions adopted from the equity market literature. 
Thus, the buy-and-hold benchmark implicitly uses a national, one-sided perspective whereas trading 
rules in foreign exchange are typically symmetric with respect to the two currencies involved. 
Regarding the index benchmarks, they implicitly assume that the trading rule would be an alternative to 
another investment. Accordingly, such benchmarks should not be taken literally. 
24 In this vein, Dewachter and Lyrio (2005) find that the application of moving average rules can 
provide a significant return to investors. 
25 This result is independent of the distribution of excess returns and follows from the Central Limit 
Theorem, which states that whenever a random sample of size T is taken from any distribution with 
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during some periods (see e.g. Silber, 1994, p.44; Neely, 1997). Thus, Menkhoff and 
Schlumberger (1995) suggest addressing the risk inherent in using technical analysis 
by focusing on the monthly difference between the rules' profitability performance 
and a buy-and-hold performance (this may be understood as a form of myopic loss 
aversion, see Benartzi and Thaler, 1995). Due to the high instability of technical 
analysis’ returns, the “excess return”—as shown by raw returns or by a Sharpe ratio 
criterion—ceases to be significant at the 5% level. 
In a recent paper, Charlebois and Sapp (2006), using daily data on dollar-mark 
over the period 1988-1998, find that moving-average trading rules generate 
significant excess returns and that the excess returns increase when information is 
included on the open interest differential on currency options (i.e. the net difference 
between the cumulative value in dollar terms of all put options that are still active on a 
given day less the cumulative value of all active call options). They interpret this as 
partly reflecting risk premia and partly as reflecting extra fundamental information 
that is reflected in options prices, since options may be the instrument of trading of 
choice of more informed traders because of the leverage advantage provided (Easley, 
O’Hara and Srinivas, 1998). Some evidence supporting this view is provided by the 
fact that when the authors exclude the fifty largest absolute daily returns, all of the 
trading rules incorporating the open interest differential become less profitable 
(implying that the excess returns of technical trading rules to some extent reflect 
compensation for risk), but many of them nevertheless remain strongly profitable. 
In summary, looking at the last column of Table 5, where risk-adjusted 
profitability is displayed, the majority of studies conclude that the profitability of 
technical currency analysis holds in a risk-adjusted sense. Going more into detail, 
there is, first, evidence that time-varying risk premia might explain some of the excess 
return of technical analysis but not all or even most of it (Taylor, 1992; Kho, 1996).26 
Furthermore, even the correct determination of appropriate risk premia is questionable 
with the present state of knowledge. A second line of argument is that it is perhaps 
possible to explain some of the excess returns using a measure of risk as perceived by 
                                                                                                                                            
mean α and variance ς2, then the sample mean will be approximately normally distributed with mean µ 
and variance ς2/T. 
26 One must admit, however, that there is not much guidance as to whether the measures of risk premia 
used in the empirical literature are fully convincing from a theoretical point of view. For example, 
Taylor’s (1992) AR(1) risk premium model may simply be too restrictive, while—as an anonymous 
referee has commented—the Kho (1996) study is based on a limited sample and has not to date been 
replicated for other currencies or sample periods. 
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market participants. Indeed, the available evidence indicates that technical analysis is 
quite risky in this respect. 
 
5 Explaining the continued use of technical analysis in the foreign exchange 
market 
Technical analysis is an important tool in real-world decision making in foreign 
exchange markets (SF1, SF2 and SF3). In addition, it appears that applying certain 
technical trading rules to volatile foreign exchange markets over a sustained period 
may lead to significant positive excess returns, although it is not clear that the 
performance of these rules is stable over time or that the excess returns earned 
significantly outweigh the associated risk premia (SF4, SF5 and SF6). 
There remains a need for further explanation of the continued and passionate 
obsession of foreign exchange professionals with technical analysis, however, as 
profitability studies have not to date arrived at a clear verdict. The organizing idea 
here is to allow explicitly for heterogeneous agents and asymmetric information in the 
foreign exchange market, which makes market efficiency a more complex concept. It 
may, however, be reassuring in this context that this complexity can indeed by rooted 
in Fama’s (1970, p.388) seminal paper on financial market efficiency, as he discusses 
“disagreement among investors about the implications of given information” as a 
potential source of “inefficiency”. So, in what way may disagreement (i.e. 
heterogeneity) help in resolving our puzzle? We group the various explanations that 
have been suggested into four positions, which we shall briefly describe before we 
relate them to rational behaviour of agents and efficient markets (see Figure 3 for an 
overview). 
If one follows the traditional understanding of the EMH and regards foreign 
exchange markets as at least weakly efficient in the sense of Fama (1970)—i.e. in the 
sense that significant profits cannot be generated using forecasts based on past price 
movements alone—then one would assess the use of technical analysis as evidence of 
irrational behaviour. This is the first explanation for the continued use of technical 
analysis in the foreign exchange market. 
However, the assumption that most professionals in the market behave 
consistently irrationally does not fit the EMH either: according to the EMH, they 
should quickly be driven out of the market as they make losses at the expense of 
rational traders. But if there is an important set of foreign exchange market 
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participants who are not directly interested in generating profit but nevertheless have a 
significant influence on the market, then these participants may generate profit-
making opportunities for technical analysts over sustained periods of time, allowing 
them to survive in the market. One such group that has been proposed in this context 
is comprised of the major central banks, and the behaviour of central banks in 
intervening in the foreign exchange market has been posited as a second explanation 
for the persistence of technical analysis. 
A third position is that if it takes time for the effects of economic 
fundamentals to feed through fully into market exchange rates, then technical analysis 
may serve as a means of detecting these kinds of influences earlier than would 
otherwise be the case. 
Fourthly and finally, it has often been argued that financial prices may not 
only reflect the information from fundamentals but also influences from other sources, 
such as the influence of noise traders or the self-fulfilling influences of technical 
analysis itself. 
Among these four explanations, it is only the first that directly refers to 
irrational behaviour of agents: either the users of technical analysis are simply 
irrational and will be driven out of the market (as suggested by Friedman, 1953) or 
they systematically underestimate risk (as suggested by De Long et al., 1990). The 
other three explanations do not rely on technicians’ irrationality but on Fama’s (1970) 
argument that not all market participants need to interpret all information at the same 
time in the same way. 
With regard to the foreign exchange intervention-explanation, it would be the 
central bank that distorts markets and technical traders profit from this “inefficiency”. 
Regarding the third explanation, technical analysis is seen as an instrument via which 
to learn about the revelation of fundamentals that cannot be recognized from 
observing fundamentals directly.27 Here, neither technical traders nor the market need 
be inefficient except according to a very strict form of the EMH requiring that market 
prices should reflect new information instantaneously; in the real world, it takes time 
to learn and technical analysis may be one method of learning. Finally, in the fourth 
strand of explanations, there are not-fully-rational traders in the market who have 
price impact and whose behaviour can be detected and exploited by technical 
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analysis. Obviously, in this case markets are not efficient and technicians who are 
rational in the sense of exploiting all available information for trading purposes 
(whether it is information about fundamentals or non-fundamental influences) will 
profit at the expense of noise traders who are irrational in the sense of not using all 
available information. 
It seems noteworthy that in the three latter explanations discussed here the 
commonality is that there are price-relevant influences that cannot be addressed by 
conventional fundamental analysis, either because the central bank intervenes or 
because fundamentals cannot be observed or else because non-fundamentals impact 
on prices.28 By using these pieces of “information” technical analysis does not 
necessarily yield excess returns. 
We review below the available empirical evidence with respect to each of 
these four positions. 
 
5.1 Technical analysis as reflecting irrational behaviour 
The charge of not-fully-rational behaviour on the part of those applying technical 
analysis is probably the most common position in explaining its use, since in its 
reliance on extrapolation and/or visual pattern recognition, technical analysis is 
inconsistent with weak efficiency of the foreign exchange market. However, as 
mentioned earlier, this position has the paradoxical implication that the market is in 
fact not efficient since technical analysis is so widely used in the market (SF1). Thus, 
there must be more subtle reasons for using technical analysis rather than just an 
outright lack of rationality. In effect, there seem to have been three arguments put 
forward in the literature. 
First, that the irrational behaviour may be of a largely temporary nature.  
Second, that it may be the case that users of technical analysis systematically 
underestimate the risks involved in its use.  
Third, that the application of technical analysis may in fact be a form of 
marketing or “window dressing” on the part of financial institutions in order to 
impress and attract less-informed clients. 
                                                                                                                                            
27 We agree with an anonymous referee that order flow seems to have a fundamental component and 
appears to be related to movements in fundamentals (Evans and Lyons, 2005b). 
28 It is thus only the third explanation that requires the presence of outright non-fundamental forces in 
the market. Intervention itself, referring to the second explanation, may react on non-fundamental 
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Regarding the first argument, concerning temporarily irrational behaviour, one 
would need information about the behaviour of participants in the time-series domain 
to test directly whether behaviour changes over time – this data is not available so far. 
An alternative is to test the cross-sectional implications of this approach, for example 
that traders relying on technical analysis tend to be less experienced and will in some 
sense learn to use fundamental analysis as their experience grows over time. Learning 
means here the same as learning the “right model”, i.e. the lesson of avoiding 
technical analysis in the future. Another implication seems to be that not-fully-rational 
behaviour will not lead to market success, so that chartists do not reach senior 
positions as often as others. Finally, non-rationality may be a consequence of a lower 
level of education, since it may be argued that technical analysis does not require any 
level of economic understanding but is—quite the contrary—easily understandable on 
an intuitive basis. 
These three implications of the assumption of temporary irrationality on the 
part of traders using technical analysis have been tested with survey data of Gehrig 
and Menkhoff (2006). The details, given in Table 6, reveal that those market 
participants who prefer the use of technical analysis are not, in fact, characterized by 
symptoms of a possibly sub-optimal behaviour (see also Menkhoff, 1997; Cheung and 
Wong, 1999; Cheung, Chinn and Marsh, 2004). 
This leads to the next argument, put forward by De Long et al. (1990) in the 
more general context of noise traders, that the application of technical analysis may be 
related to an underestimation of the risk involved by its users. Again, there is no direct 
evidence available which could inform about risk preferences and risk perception of 
chartists. Moreover, the studies examining risk-adjusted profitability do not come to a 
unanimous conclusion (see Section 4). The only study that directly compares the 
consequences of relying on technical rather than fundamental analysis is that of 
Curcio and Goodhart (1993). In their experiment the profit of technical traders and of 
fundamentalists was similar but the volatility was lower for the users of technical 
analysis. This might indicate, therefore, that technical analysis can in fact serve as a 
risk-reducing instrument. As this is, however, only a single study, the significance of 
this result should not be overstated. 
                                                                                                                                            
prices or create them. The third explanation may be related to non-fundamental prices when market 
participants are affected by a preference for certain figures. 
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Fortunately, there is another piece of evidence which can be drawn from the 
form of technical analysis that is preferred. Both studies asking this question come to 
the same conclusion that trend-following forms dominate rate of change indicators 
(see Taylor and Allen, 1992, Table 1A; Lui and Mole, 1998, Table 4). If one assumes 
that most people would regard “going with the wave” as less risky than betting against 
it, this preference of available instruments does not indicate risk-loving behaviour. 
Overall, therefore, the evidence presented is unavoidably thin. Nevertheless, 
available information does not support the notion of chartists being a selection of 
people who underestimate risk in general. 
There is, finally, a third argument in favour of not-fully-rational behaviour on 
the part of technical traders – the marketing argument. The claim here is not that 
technical analysis can provide any useful information in forecasting but that it 
generates buy and sell signals which translate into fee and commission income for 
financial intermediaries (see e.g. Sylla, 1992, p.343). This view may characterise the 
motivation of those selling technical analysis, but it does not explain why others buy 
such services. If technical analysis were particularly popular with small investors or 
other less professional market participants (e.g. “day traders”), this argument would 
come close to the first argument discussed above, i.e. that of sub-optimal behaviour. 
Unfortunately, there is no evidence that small investors are in fact particularly heavy 
users of technical analysis, although it is known that a large number of professionals 
adhere to this tool. In addition to the evidence presented in Section 3 it can be said 
that according to the survey of Taylor and Allen (1992, Table 1), most institutions 
subscribe to some form of external chartist advice. Moreover, about 25% employ an 
in-house technical analyst in comparison to 39% who employ an in-house economist 
(ibid., Table 2). 
In summary, the evidence regarding the not-fully-rational behaviour position 
in explaining the use of technical analysis is mostly quite indirect. Nevertheless, it is 
interesting to note that available information points against rather than in favour of 
this position.29 
 
5.2 Technical analysis as exploiting the impact of central bank interventions 
                                                 
29 Despite this interpretation of the available systematic evidence we do not wish to claim that there is 
no irrationality in the market (Oberlechner, 2004; Oberlechner and Osler, 2006). 
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As the central bank is not part of the regular market process and, in particular, foreign 
exchange intervention is not generally motivated by profit considerations, the process 
of central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market may provide an 
explanation as to why financial markets are actually efficient although excess returns 
can be earned. This idea was formulated long ago—see, for example, Dooley and 
Shafer (1983, p. 65), Levich (1985) or Sweeney (1986)—but it had not been tested in 
a rigorous way until quite recently. 
The seminal paper in this respect is the study by LeBaron (1999). He applies a 
simple moving average rule to a fourteen-year period (1979 to 1992) of daily as well 
as weekly time series of D-Mark/US-Dollar and Yen/US-Dollar exchange rates. This 
rule generates considerable returns—of the order of more than 5% per year (LeBaron, 
1999, Table 4). LeBaron calculates, however, the effect of removing days when 
official foreign exchange interventions took place. The result is that the formerly 
highly profitable technical analysis rules diminish in attractiveness (LeBaron, 1999, 
Figure 2). This indicates that intervention “has something to do with the observed 
predictability” (ibid., p.137). In order to address the issue of a possible third factor in 
this analysis, LeBaron (1999) undertakes several checks to investigate the existence of 
common factors that might drive interventions and profitability of technical analysis 
at the same time. One finding is that periods of highest expected volatility (calculated 
using GARCH models) are not those of highest profitability of the moving average 
rules.  
The thrust of this literature suggests that official interventions may distort the 
relationship between standard fundamentals and exchange rate movements and 
thereby disadvantage fundamentals-oriented traders while possibly favouring 
technical traders, for example if the intervention creates trends in the exchange rate or 
support and resistance levels. 
LeBaron’s (1999) analysis has been extended by Saacke (2002). Saacke not 
only considers US data but also interventions by the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
Moreover, this study covers two additional years and considers a wide range of 
technical analysis rules and confirms LeBaron's findings. 
Other studies that make similar arguments concerning the influence of central 
bank intervention on technical analysis profitability include Silber (1994) and 
Szakmary and Mathur (1997). Silber (1994) generally links markets where technical 
analysis is profitable with the fact that these are the markets where central banks 
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intervene. Szakmary and Mathur (1997) examine five major foreign exchange 
markets but rely on the IMF's International Financial Statistics to infer the degree of 
intervention from data on foreign exchange reserves. These monthly figures cannot 
reveal higher frequency interventions and are influenced by nuisance components, 
such as revaluations or interventions in third currencies. Interestingly, however, they 
nevertheless reach basically the same conclusion as LeBaron (1999). 
This interpretation—i.e. that central bank intervention may be the source of 
the profitability of technical analysis—has been cautiously questioned by Neely 
(1998). He stresses the point that, due to LeBaron's methodology, most of the profits 
from technical analysis rules occur concurrently with intervention operations (see 
Neely, 1998, p.7f.). If official interventions tend to occur when markets are trending, 
this would also explain the findings of LeBaron and others. In particular, if 
intervention days are those where markets move heavily (and might possibly move 
even more strongly without interventions), then interventions and technical analysis 
profitability may be positively correlated. The decisive step necessary to test this 
competing interpretation is the use of intradaily as opposed to daily data. 
Neely (2002) has performed this task by combining several sources of daily 
data available at different times during the trading day. He checked the timing of 
technical analysis profitability and intervention for five exchange rates, mostly over 
the period from 1983 to 1998. Neely finds that “intervention reacts to the same strong 
short-run trends from which the trading rules have recently profited” (Neely, 2002, 
p.230). The result is confirmed for a high-frequency analysis of Bundesbank 
interventions (Frenkel and Stadtmann, 2004). It is also compatible with Neely and 
Weller's (2001) result on daily data, namely that their genetic programming rules are 
most profitable on the day before interventions take place.30 Moreover, information 
about central bank information does not increase profitability. 
In a recent study using daily data on the mark-dollar exchange rate and foreign 
exchange intervention data from the Federal Reserve and the Bundesbank, Reitz and 
Taylor (2006) analyze the interaction of chartism, fundamentalism and central bank 
                                                 
30 One reason that technical analysis may be profitable before interventions was revealed by Peiers 
(1997) indicating that one bank had superior forecasting performance with respect to later 
interventions. It seems plausible that this bank had an information advantage, so that these profits may 
be due to private information—this would not reject market efficiency in its semi-strong form, i.e. 
relying on the use of publicly available information. Probably, this finding should not be generalized to 
other banks as the persistent forecasting power could not be found for other situations as well (Sapp, 
2002; Dominguez, 2003). 
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intervention and provide evidence that intervention is most likely to occur and to be 
effective after a period of sustained trending away from the equilibrium level 
suggested by purchasing power parity. They argue that this is evidence of the 
“coordination channel” of intervention effectiveness, which has been put forward by 
Taylor (1994, 2004) and Sarno and Taylor (2001a). According to the coordination 
channel, if technical analysts are capable of driving the exchange rate away from its 
fundamental equilibrium level over a sustained period, then fundamentalist analysis 
will not be profitable and fundamentalists will lose credibility in the market, or 
confidence in the fundamentals. Hence, fundamentalists will reduce their trades based 
on fundamental analysis and the exchange rate will tend to stick away from (and 
perhaps still trending away from) the fundamental equilibrium. (This is an example of 
the “limits of arbitrage” effect, as suggested in a more general setting by Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997.) When this occurs, the central bank may at some point intervene 
publicly in the hope that the intervention will act as a coordinating signal to 
fundamentalists to enter the market at the same time and so return the exchange rate 
to its fundamental equilibrium level. To the extent that fundamentalists rally to the 
central bank’s clarion call, the intervention will then be effective. Using a nonlinear 
microstructural model of exchange rate behaviour, Reitz and Taylor (2006) find 
evidence supportive of the existence of a coordination channel of intervention 
effectiveness. 
The coordination channel therefore provides a rationale as to why 
intervention, the use (or profitability) of technical analysis, and trending exchange 
rates may all coincide. Note, however, that the coordination channel implies that 
intervention may be effective because technical analysis is effective in generating a 
sustained trend away from fundamentals, not vice versa. 
A final piece of evidence on the relation between intervention and technical 
analysis profitability is provided by Sapp (2004). He finds that market uncertainty—
measured by spread and volatility—is high before interventions and lower afterwards. 
This provides an economic rationale for interventions (see also Chaboud and 
LeBaron, 2001) and indicates that profits earned by technical analysis during these 
periods may be a compensation for risk. 
 
5.3 Technical analysis as a method of information processing  
 28 
Another explanation for the continued use of technical analysis is that it is in fact 
simply an instrument for processing and assimilating market information that is 
contained in exchange rates. The question concerning how fundamental information is 
imparted into financial prices has long been a field of debate. If one leaves the 
macroeconomic level and goes down to the actions of individual market participants 
at the microstructural level, it becomes clear that it will often be single entities or 
limited groups that recognize or correctly interpret fundamental changes earlier than 
others. These others may for some time interpret the actions of the better informed 
group as liquidity or noise trading, so learning takes time. Assuming that the 
fundamentally correct view succeeds in the end implies that there exists an 
intermediate period during which exchange rates move from the “incorrect” to the 
“correct” level. Hellwig (1982) was among the first to model this process and to note 
that it allows less informed traders to infer information from observing past price 
movements. Thus, on this argument, inferring future price movements from past price 
movements, as in technical analysis, may not be so irrational after all (Treynor and 
Ferguson, 1985; Brown and Jennings, 1989).31 
The decisive point in this connection, however, is whether or not this 
reasoning has any resemblance with the real-world conditions of foreign exchange 
markets. Some evidence that this is indeed the case is provided by Sager and Taylor 
(2004) and Melvin, Sager and Taylor (2006), who show, using five-minute data on 
dollar-sterling and dollar-euro exchange rates, that there is an upward shift in 
exchange rate volatility following the interest rate announcements of the European 
Central Bank and the Bank of England, suggesting a period of learning. Earlier work 
supporting this notion includes Goodhart's (1988) examination of exchange rate 
changes in reaction to major fundamental news, which he assesses as initial under-
reaction (see Evans and Lyons, 2005a). Further, a number of authors have recently 
analysed the high-frequency reaction of foreign exchange markets to news 
announcements more generally, and this work reveals that markets do react very 
quickly: most price reaction to scheduled news is in the form of an immediate jump 
(Andersen et al., 2003). Unfortunately, however, these price changes explain only a 
marginal fraction of overall price variability and even after such marked jumps 
                                                 
31 Nevertheless, there is always the possibility—as an anonymous referee has pointed out—that 
information processing can sometimes be linked to the ‘simple heuristics’ side of the psychology 
literature (e.g. Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999). 
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volatility remains persistent for at least an hour—indicating that much more is going 
in the market.32 Over longer horizons, by contrast, it is known that exchange rates 
converge towards fundamental values (see, e.g. Mark, 1995; Lothian and Taylor, 
1996). 
Taken together, there emerges from this evidence a pattern whereby exchange 
rates tend to react quickly but nevertheless may under-react on the announcement of 
fundamental news. Despite their reversion to the fundamental value over longer 
horizons, there is an intermediate period where price changes are imperfectly 
understood. The role of technical analysis—in the form of trend-following signalling 
rules (e.g. moving average rules)—may therefore be to detect emerging shorter-term 
trends. There is some empirical evidence consistent with this interpretation.33 
First, foreign exchange professionals show a pattern in their expectations 
formation that clearly resembles this stylized pattern of reaction to fundamental news. 
In particular, they reveal bandwagon (highly extrapolative) expectations over horizons 
of a week to a few months tendency towards regressive expectations over longer 
horizons (Froot and Ito, 1989; Frankel and Froot, 1990, 1990a; Ito, 1990). Thus, 
evidence that appears hard to reconcile with rational expectations may, indeed, be 
evidence of learning. If the learning process means for example that information is 
increasingly imparted into prices, then extrapolative expectations and respective 
technical trading rules may have a rational basis. 
Second, central banks that do not explicitly intend to make profits by 
intervening, may nevertheless do so (Sweeney, 1997; Sarno and Taylor, 2001a). 
Insofar as central banks intervene, one may thus interpret their behaviour as 
tantamount to possessing knowledge about a true fundamental equilibrium exchange 
rate (or, at least, a range within which the fundamental must lie)—thus “buying low” 
and “selling high” to correct misalignments of fundamentals—and from which they 
can profit in the long run but not in the shorter term (see e.g. Saacke, 2002). This 
implies that fundamentals do not necessarily feed immediately into exchange rates 
and that technicians may try to exploit what they can learn as central banks intervene. 
                                                 
32 An anonymous referee has pointed out that the limited power of such studies to explain exchange 
rate behaviour even within short intervals may suggest that other forces are at work. The role of 
technical analysis is unclear in this respect as it could either be used as an instrument via which to 
assimilate information, or itself be a factor impeding the incorporation of fundamentals into prices. 
33 There are theoretical papers, such as Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), which are capable of 
explaining the coexistence of short-term trends and longer-term mean reversion, although the 
“behavioural” elements of these models have been criticised by, e.g., Fama (1998) and Schwert (2002). 
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Third, it is a stylized fact that fundamental exchange rate models fail 
empirically at shorter-term horizons (Sarno and Taylor, 2002; Cheung, Chinn and 
Garcia Pascual, 2005). Nevertheless, recent research demonstrates the predictability 
of exchange rates over shorter-term horizons (see e.g. Clarida and Taylor, 1997; 
Clarida et al., 2003). Interestingly, exchange rate predictability appears to depend on 
two elements: first, the term structure of interest rates (and therefore the term structure 
of forward exchange rates) may capture complex expectations and, second, the regime 
switching process may be related to different “environments” of exchange rate 
determination. A fundamental interpretation of these influences seems much more 
difficult then the “direct” and atheoretical approach via technical analysis rules. 
Fourth, technical analysis rules have most often been examined for shorter-
term reactions—for example, in the case of long-short moving average combinations, 
in the band between five to ten days for the short moving average and up to about 150 
days for the long moving average. Saacke (2002, p.464) demonstrates that this 
combination, both in application by market practitioners and in academic studies, 
appears to fit the range within which these rules are most profitable. Their application 
does not make sense at the very short-term end or over longer horizons. This is 
consistent with the position that technical analysis may be able to catch a sluggish and 
then overshooting shorter-term adjustment of exchange rates to fundamentals. 
A further strand of the literature has focussed on the information contained in 
order flow that may help in understanding exchange rate movements (e.g. Ito, Lyons 
and Melvin, 1998; Lyons, 2001; Evans and Lyons, 2002). An important study in this 
connection by Osler (2003) demonstrates that customer orders can be usefully linked 
to technical analysis. Her study uses data on almost ten thousand conditional customer 
orders at a large US bank over a period of more than seven months in 1999-2000.34 In 
particular, Osler constructs a limit-order book, defined as the set of currency stop-loss 
and take-profit orders existing at any point in time, and finds that orders are not 
placed randomly but concentrate near “round” exchange rate values at “big figures” or 
“half big figures” (such as a rate of 1.6100 or 1.6150 dollars per pound, rather than, 
say 1.6125 or 1.6133). The clustering of orders and the respective behaviour of three 
exchange rates is indeed consistent with the predictions of technical analysis that, 
                                                 
34 Accordingly, this study focuses on higher frequencies than most studies covered in Section 4 on 
profitability which use daily data, which apply rules changing positions typically after weeks and 
which analyze years of trading. 
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first, downtrends tend to be reversed at support levels and vice versa and, second, that 
trends gain momentum when support or resistance levels are crossed. 
A fruitful extension of this work, which has not so far been examined for the 
foreign exchange market, refers to the ability of technical analysis to locate order-
book depth. In particular, in a study of order flow on the New York Stock Exchange, 
Kavajecz and Odders-White (2004) show, first, that support and resistance levels of 
technical analysis are related to price levels in the order book where liquidity is very 
high (echoing Osler’s, 2003 results) and, second, that simple moving average 
indicators inform about the relative depth of the order book on one or the other side, 
which they call the “skewness of liquidity”. 
Overall, the conclusion that emerges from the research on limit-order books is 
that “technical analysis works because orders are clustered” (Osler, 2003).35 More 
specifically, on a superficial level, it is order flow which generates the basis for the 
success of technical analysis but on a deeper level it is really customers’ preference 
for round numbers in this context.36 If decision makers’ behaviour is subject to other 
habits and rules of thumb, then this may provide a basis for the use of other forms of 
technical analysis as means of exploiting movements in exchange rates generated by 
non-fundamental influences (see the next sub-section). 
However, patterns in exchange rate movements may also reflect institutional 
design. Thus it is known that some technical trading rules rely heavily on very 
specific prices during the trading day—in particular the opening, closing, high and 
low prices. One can link these prices to order flows in the sense that opening and 
closing prices may reveal more permanent demand and supply imbalances due to the 
need of many dealers to square their positions at the end of their day, whereas high 
and low prices may reveal a mismatch of buy and sell orders. The econometric study 
of Fiess and MacDonald (2002) shows that analyzing these specific prices can 
generate useful forecasts of exchange rates (and volatility).37 
                                                 
35 Another clustering, one in the time dimension, is analyzed by Lillo and Farmer (2004) for the 
London Stock Exchange. They find that the sign of orders, i.e. either buy or sell, is positively 
correlated. It seems intuitively possible to formulate technical trading rules in order to exploit such 
properties. 
36 An anonymous referee has commented that a feedback channel may also exist if technical analysts 
use “big figures” or “round numbers” in foreign exchange prices, which may motivate customers to 
place orders accordingly. 
37 Popular technical trading rules relying on these specific prices are so-called candlestick formations or 
stochastics indicators. 
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One could thus speculate whether similar institutionally motivated effects 
might be detected in the behaviour of international fund managers. It has been argued 
that equity market fund managers may have incentives for herding and, moreover, that 
there is shorter-term momentum in the returns of stocks which may be caused by 
herding behaviour (e.g. Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers, 1995). Further, there are 
indications of short-term under-reaction to news and medium-term over-reaction, so 
that shorter-term momentum and longer-term contrarian investment strategies appear 
to promise excess returns (e.g. Jegadeesh and Titman, 2001). If this behaviour 
translates from stock prices to foreign exchange, it may be responsible for generating 
shorter-term trends, i.e. momentum, which may be detected by technical analysis 
rules (see Okunev and White, 2003). As these considerations are necessarily 
speculative, it may be reassuring that the reverse chain of argument has some 
substantiation: if this kind of behaviour were able to generate successful technical 
trading in the foreign exchange market, it should do so in the equity market. Some 
studies lend support to this view of equity markets (e.g. Brock, Lakonishok and 
LeBaron, 1992; Blume, Easley and O'Hara, 1994; Lo, Mamaysky and Wang, 2000; 
Kavajecz and Odders-White, 2004). It is also interesting to note that “round” figures 
seem to play a prominent role in stock markets (Donaldson and Kim, 1993). This is, 
however, clearly an avenue for future foreign exchange market research. 
 
5.4 Technical analysis as providing information about non-fundamental 
exchange rate determinants 
The last position analyzed here—i.e. that technical analysis may provide information 
about non-fundamental influences on exchange rates—is quite common both in the 
literature and among market practitioners. For example Taylor and Allen (1992, 
p.311) mention two recurrent groups of comments made by respondents to their 
survey of London foreign exchange dealers, namely: “a belief that charts essentially 
measure swings in market psychology” and “that chart analysis may be largely self-
fulfilling”. Both views imply that exchange rates may not be exclusively dependent 
on the course of fundamentals but may also react to additional, non-fundamental 
factors. 
This position clearly views the foreign exchange market to a certain degree as 
inefficient in the sense that prices do not only reflect fundamental information. A 
prominent model in this vein is DeLong et al. (1990), where not-fully-rational noise 
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traders create risks for rational investors with limited arbitrage capacity. The role of 
technical analysis in this environment is to provide an instrument to analyze and 
possibly forecast the behaviour of noise traders. Therefore, technicians are seen as 
rational agents who exploit noise traders without necessarily bringing exchange rates 
closer to economic fundamentals. 
The notion that there may be social psychological influences on financial 
markets was noted over twenty years ago by Shiller (1984) and it has been 
investigated more systematically in later research. Regarding foreign exchange 
markets, the conceptually similar survey studies of Cheung and Wong (2000), Cheung 
and Chinn (2001) and Cheung, Chinn and Marsh (2004) directly asked market 
practitioners about their assessment of the price relevance of several factors that can 
be linked to psychological influences on the market. The result, presented graphically 
in Figure 4, clearly shows the importance that foreign exchange dealers attach to 
psychological forces in the very short run. 
Whereas these three survey studies ask for the perceived importance of 
technical factors in competition with psychological factors, the study by Gehrig and 
Menkhoff (2006) allows an analysis of the implicit relations between these two 
factors (the results hold for data from Menkhoff, 1997). In particular, if one relates the 
weight given by traders to the use of technical analysis and the perceived importance 
of psychological price influences, a positive correlation becomes obvious (see the 
lightly shaded bars in Figure 5). 
A similar approach can be applied to learn about the possibility of the self-
fulfilling nature of technical analysis, which, to date, has not been examined 
systematically. One reason why this issue has not been examined may be an ex ante 
scepticism against this possibility, as it is well-known that chartists differ markedly in 
the instruments they use and even more so in their respective calibration (e.g. the 
precise number of days used in moving average rules), and may also display 
significant heterogeneity in their forecasts (Allen and Taylor, 1990). Nevertheless, 
asking those who use technical analysis their opinion as to the self-fulfilling 
hypothesis leads to a bimodal relation—i.e. there emerge two views: either an 
“opportunists’ view” whereby chartism is used because it is perceived as self-
fulfilling, or a “believers’ view” whereby chartism is seen as an intrinsically valuable 
methodology rather than merely self-fulfilling in its predictions (see the dark shaded 
bars in Figure 5). Interestingly, the opportunists’ view appears to have gained ground 
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over time (Menkhoff, 1997).38 Given that the use of technical analysis has also 
become more widespread over time, this suggests that traders may indeed alter the 
weight attached to technical analysis in accordance to its perceived forecasting power 
(as originally suggested by Frankel and Froot, 1986, 1990). 
Additional indirect support for non-fundamental price influences in foreign 
exchange markets is provided by recent models with heterogeneous agents (Hommes, 
2005). These models have in common that complex interaction between 
heterogeneous groups of actors can successfully generate stylised facts in financial 
markets, such as fat tails in the distribution of returns and volatility clustering. What is 
remarkable here is the fact that the most prominent way of describing the behaviour of 
non-fundamentalists is to assume trend-following behaviour, which is often motivated 
by applying technical analysis (Lux, 1998; Westerhoff, 2003; De Grauwe and 
Grimaldi, 2006; Reitz and Taylor, 2006). 
In a related study modelling the interaction of agents with different horizons, 
LeBaron (2001) finds that such a computational stock market produces some well-
known characteristics of foreign exchange as well. Different time scales of 
heterogeneous agents are an important subject in foreign exchange (Dacorogna et al., 
2001) and seem to be intuitively directly related to the relatively short-term oriented 
chartists as discussed above (stylised fact 3). 
In a recent study using intraday exchange rate data, Dominguez and Panthaki 
(2006) distinguish three categories of factors generating exchange rate movements: 
fundamental news, order flow (reflecting private information) and non-fundamental 
news. The most prominent relation of non-fundamentals news—derived from 
newswire reports—is to technical analysis. This evidence indicates both that non-
fundamental influences may have significant short-run effects on exchange rates and 
that they may be related to technical analysis. 
In another recent innovative study, Schulmeister (2006) analyzes market-wide 
relations between signals from technical analysis (using 1024 different trading rules), 
exchange rates and order flow. He finds that during most periods, the trading rules 
under consideration tend to be on the same side of the market, and so may possibly be 
                                                 
38 Of course, the self-fulfilling nature of technical analysis cannot be an example of perpetual motion—
returns must ultimately be generated by trading with others. Thus, this view is basically informative 
about the motivation of users. One may, however, speculate whether users of technical analysis who 
are motivated solely by the fact that other market participants are using it may in effect end up as 
market followers often do, i.e. as losers. 
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pushing exchanges rates by generating similar trading signals. The analysis is then 
extended to include order flow for a three-month period (the sample period being 
limited by data availability). During this three-month period the vast majority of the 
technical analysis considered tended to generate trading positions similar to those 
generated using signals based on order flow. Consequently, this (admittedly short-
sample) study suggests that order flow could be the result of technical trading, in 
addition to the earlier examined sources of information revelation and liquidity 
trading (Evans and Lyons, 2005a). Thus, Schulmeister conjectures that technical 
analysis may magnify otherwise small exchange rate changes, contributing to the kind 
of short-term overreactions mentioned above in a self-fulfilling fashion (see also 
Farmer and Joshi, 2002). 
Although there seems to be some support for the position that technical 
analysis is an instrument for processing and assimilating information about non-
fundamental price determinants, it should be noted that the evidence so far only 
reveals three facts. First, that a significant proportion of foreign exchange market 
participants believe in non-fundamental influences on exchange rates. Second, that 
those who believe more strongly rely more heavily on technical analysis. Third, that 
participants believing in technical analysis often ascribe its importance to its self-
fulfilling nature. These facts would also be consistent with the view that chartists do 
not understand the fundamental nature of exchange rates. However, there are two 
further pieces of evidence that give weight to the proposition under review in this sub-
section. 
First, as discussed above in Sub-Section 5.1, there is no evidence that the use 
of non-fundamental information—among which technical analysis is perhaps the most 
important—could be related to indicators of reduced rationality (see Menkhoff, 1998). 
Second, the position under review here fits well with the puzzle mentioned in the 
introduction that shorter-term exchange rate movements cannot be explained with 
existing fundamental models (the so-called “disconnect puzzle”). If there are other 
forces at work (see e.g. Dominguez and Panthaki, 2006), this would help us solve the 
puzzle and at the same time provide a rationale for the use of technical analysis. 
 
6 Conclusion 
A reading of the literature on the nature and use of technical analysis in the foreign 
exchange market allows us to draw up a set of stylised facts concerning its nature and 
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use, and also to distinguish a number of arguments that have typically been adduced 
to explain its continued use. 
Indeed, first and foremost among these stylised facts lies the continued and 
widespread use of technical analysis in the foreign exchange market. Research 
conducted in most of the major foreign exchange markets during the last decade or so 
reveals clearly that the use of technical analysis is an important and persistent 
phenomenon which is highly influential in the decision making of foreign exchange 
professionals. A similar situation emerges with respect to the profitability of technical 
analysis. It is beyond question that for major flexible exchange rates and over longer 
time periods the use of technical analysis may be used to provide excess returns. What 
is disputed, however, is whether the realization of these profits has to be bought at the 
cost of taking large risks and whether the profits can fully compensate for this 
additional risk. 
A contribution that we have sought to make in this paper is in relating the 
available empirical evidence to several positions that have been developed in order to 
explain the continued use of technical analysis. 
The first of these—interpreting the use of technical analysis as an indication of 
not-fully-rational behaviour—is difficult to reconcile with the fact that virtually all 
professionals in the market rely on this tool at least to a small degree. Moreover, there 
is no hard evidence showing that chartists are characterized by temporarily sub-
optimal behaviour, or underestimate the risk involved or accept technical analysis as a 
marketing instrument. 
The second position, relating profitability to foreign exchange interventions by 
the monetary authorities, is a little more satisfying in the sense that it suggests a more 
solid rationale for the use of technical analysis by rational agents. Also, some stylized 
facts concerning the profitability of technical analysis—namely that it tends to be 
more profitable during periods of official intervention—fit well with this position. 
There is, however, more recent evidence that suggests that it may be large exchange 
rate movements themselves that may be leading both intervention and technical 
analysis profitability or, equivalently, that the influence of technical analysis, by 
driving the exchange rate away from the level consistent with the fundamentals, may 
generate a rationale for official intervention, rather than vice versa, through the 
coordination channel of intervention effectiveness. 
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The third position, namely that technical analysis is simply an instrument in 
the processing and assimilation of market information, can also reconcile the 
importance of order flows and technical analysis to some degree. The main problem 
with this position, however, is that it does not explain the reason behind sluggish 
adjustment to news, preferences for round figures in order placement, etc. 
Overall, therefore, perhaps the most satisfying explanation concerning the 
continued use of technical analysis seems to be position four, whereby technical 
analysis is seen as an instrument informing traders about non-fundamental price 
determinants. These forces are more important in the shorter-run, so for a full 
understanding of exchange rate dynamics, professionals need a combination of 
several tools, in particular both technical and fundamental analysis. This position also 
fits well with the stylised fact on the higher profitability of technical analysis in 
flexible exchange rate markets, as there is some indication that these markets may be 
characterized by a degree of volatility that is hard to explain by fundamentals alone 
(Flood and Rose, 1995). 
This still leaves open, however, the question of risk-adjusted profitability. If 
technical analysis has some rationale in the sense of being able to generate profitable 
trading rules, why does the market process not assimilate or arbitrage these profit 
opportunities away? The answer may be the same as with fundamental analysis: in 
well functioning markets one would expect that profit opportunities will be exploited 
up to an extent where agents feel appropriately compensated for their risk. To take 
open positions is inherently risky, whether the decision is based on fundamental or 
technical considerations. In the case of technical analysis, most studies simulate 
situations where one would need to operate with a horizon of several years and apply 
some diversification regarding currencies and chartist rules. This is a situation which 
does not describe a real-world alternative. Thus, this kind of profitability does not 
contradict the notion of efficient markets, accepting the present limitations of 
operating horizon (see Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
What is perhaps most striking from our reading of the literature is that 
technical analysis remains a passionate obsession of many foreign exchange market 
professionals. It is clearly an intrinsic part of this market and it has thus to be 
understood and integrated into economic reasoning at both the macroeconomic and 
the microstructural levels. 
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Note: The regressions are calculated as best fit of a polynomial of second order. 
  The data from Menkhoff and Gehrig and Menkhoff are transformed in the following way: the in-
dividual weight given to fundamental analysis (f) and to technical analysis (t) is put into one 
measure x. x =⎪ f - t ⎪: (f + t) * 100. The percentage is then put into the scale 0 to 10 according 
to: x < 10% → 0; 10% ≤ x < 20% → 1; ...; 90% ≤ x < 100% → 9; 100% → 10 
The data from Oberlechner are transformed as follows: < 6 (strong complementarity) → 0, < 5 
→ 2, < 4 and < 7 → 4, < 3 and < 8 → 6, < 2 and < 9 → 8, < 1 and < 10 → 10 (each value multi-
plied by 0.6 to account for different scaling). 
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Figure 3. An overview of explanations for the use of technical analysis on 
foreign exchange markets 
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Figure 5.   The weight given to technical analysis in relation to a psychological 
rationale for its use and the ‘self-fulfilling’ rationale for its use 
 
Question: "How much importance do fundamentals and psychology have for exchange rate move-
ments?" 
() People are not machines; thus psychology is clearly more important than fundamentals. 
Question: "What is in your opinion the value of technical analysis?" 
() I regard technical analysis only because others regard it. 
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Notes:  Data are taken from the study Gehrig and Menkhoff (2006). Please note that the y-axis starts 
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Table 1.  Information on questionaire survey studies 
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Taylor and 
Allen (1992) 
 1988  London chief  
FX dealers 
213  60.3% 
           
Menkhoff 
(1997) 
 1992  Germany FX dealers; 
int'l fund 
managers 
205  41.3% 
           
Lui and Mole 
(1998) 
 1995  Hong Kong FX dealers 153  18.8% 
           
Cheung and 
Wong (2000) 
 1995/96  Hong Kong, 
Singapore, 
Tokyo 
FX dealers 392  20.0% 
           
Oberlechner 
(2001) 
 1996  Switzerland, 
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Kingdom, 
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FX dealers; 
(financial 
journalists) 
321  
(59) 
 53.5% 
(29.5%) 
           
Cheung and 
Chinn (2001) 
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States 
FX dealers 142  8.1% 
           
Cheung, Chinn 
and Marsh 
(2004) 
 1998  United 
Kingdom 
FX dealers 110  5.8% 
           
Gehrig und 
Menkhoff 
(2004) 
 2001  Germany, 
(Austria) 
FX dealers; 
int'l fund 
managers 
203  51.9% 
 
    
Table 2.  The importance of technical analysis according to questionnaire  
surveys 
 
Study  form of analy-
sis for deci-
sion  
making 
some use 
of  
technical 
analysis 
share of 
technical 
plus fun-
damental 
analysis 
to total 
forms(2) 
share of 
technical 
analysis to 
technical 
plus fun-
damental 
analysis(2) 
 the relation 
between the 
weight of 
technical  
analysis and 
horizon 
           
Taylor and 
Allen (1992) 
 fundamental 
analysis; 
technical 
analysis 
89.4% 100% 32%(4)  strictly        
negative 
           
Menkhoff 
(1997) 
 fundamental; 
technical; 
flow analysis 
>90% 82% 45%  weakly  
hump- 
shaped 
           
Lui and 
Mole (1998) 
 fundamental; 
technical 
~100% 100% 51%(5)  strictly       
negative 
           
Cheung and 
Wong 
(2000)(1) 
 fundamental; 
technical; 
bandwagon; 
overreaction; 
speculative 
forces 
n.a. 62%(3) 40%(3)  strongly 
hump-
shaped 
           
Oberlechner 
(2001) 
 fundamental;  
technical 
>98% 100% 49%  strictly    
negative 
           
Cheung and 
Chinn 
(2001)(1) 
 see Cheung 
and Wong 
(2000) 
n.a. 56% 29%  strongly 
hump-  
shaped 
           
Cheung, 
Chinn and 
Marsh 
(2004) 
 see Cheung 
and Wong 
(2000) 
n.a. 49%(6) 
54%(7) 
47%(6) 
29%(7) 
 strongly 
hump-  
shaped 
           
Gehrig and 
Menkhoff 
(2004) 
 fundamental; 
technical; 
flows analy-
sis 
> 90% 77% 53%  weakly  
hump-  
shaped 
 
Notes: (1) These studies do not directly ask for analytical tools but for "factors determining exchange 
 rate movements". 
(2) Unweighed averages of values for different horizons. 
(3) Data based on Hong Kong only (values for Singapore and Tokyo are similar). 
(4) Share is calculated as ratio of scale values 0 to 4 / scale values 0 to 4 plus 6 to 10 (i.e. pref-
erence for technical analysis to total preferences); weighed with share of respondents at re-
spective horizon (see Taylor and Allen, 1992, Table 3 B first column). 
(5) Share is calculated as ratio of importance given to technical analysis to total. 
(6) Traders were asked to select the technique which best characterizes their dealing method. 
(7) This value is a more indirect indication and is derived from the same question as mentioned 
in footnote (1). 
  MT-T3 
Table 3.   The importance of technical analysis in several sub-groups and at ty-
pical forecasting horizons 
 
Question:  "Please evaluate the importance of the three following information types for your typical 
decision making, by distributing a total of 100 points. For information types which you do 
not use, please give 0 points." 
... Fundamentals (economic, political) 
... Technical Analysis (charts, quantitative methods) 
... Flows (who is doing what, which customer orders are existing) 
 
  Menkhoff (1997, 1998) Gehrig and Menkhoff (2006)
Horizon  chief 
FX 
dealers 
 core 
FX 
dealers
 other 
FX 
dealers
int’l 
fund 
managers
chief 
FX 
dealers
 other 
FX 
dealers 
 int'l 
fund man-
agers 
               
               
Intraday  30.5  36.6  23.2 n.a. 45.0  37.3  n.a. 
               
Few days  37.8  38.6  44.0 45.0 45.9  45.1  52.5 
               
Few weeks  34.3  42.5  40.6 35.9 46.9  37.3  32.8 
               
2 to 6 months  42.6  50.0  29.3 36.1 28.3  31.7  31.7 
               
6 to 12 months  (20)  n.a.  (20) 30.0 (0)  n.a.  (15.0) 
               
> 12 months  n.a.  n.a.  (40) n.a. (100)  (30)  n.a. 
               
               
Mean  35.4  38.4  39.9 36.1 44.9  40.0  37.0 
               
n   44  66  39 50 42  102  58 
               
               
 
Notes:  Data are from the studies Menkhoff (1997, 1998) and Gehrig and Menkhoff (2006). The first 
value of 30.5 says that chief FX dealers who have a typical intraday forecasting horizon give 
technical analysis a weight of 30.5% (out of 100% for fundamental, technical and order flow 
analysis). Shaded cells mark the typical horizon (median value) for decision making of the re-
spective group (e.g. 49% of core FX dealers mark intraday as their typical horizon). Numbers 
in parenthesis refer to groups with 1 to 3 responses. 
  
 
  MT-T4 
Table 4. Earlier studies examining the profitability of technical analysis in 
  foreign exchange markets 
 
           
consideration of Study   period 
covered 
 number 
of 
exchan
ge 
rates 
form of 
technical 
analysis 
trans-
action 
costs 
interest 
rates 
risk 
 excess 
returns 
of tech-
nical 
analysis
             
Poole (1967)  1919-
24/29 
 9 10 filters no No no  + 
             
Poole (1967a) 
 
 1950-62  1 12 filters no No no  + 
             
Dooley and 
Shafer (1976) 
 1973-75  8 filter     + 
             
Logue and 
Sweeney 
(1977) 
 1970-74  1 14 filters yes no no  + 
             
Logue, 
Sweeney and 
Willett (1978) 
 1973-76  7 11 filters no no no  + 
             
Cornell and 
Dietrich (1978) 
 1973-75  6 13 filters, 
27 mov. 
averages 
yes no yes  + 
             
Dooley and 
Shafer (1983) 
 1973-81  9 7 filters yes yes no  + 
             
Sweeney 
(1986) 
 1973-80  10 7 filters yes partially yes  + 
             
Schulmeister 
(1987) 
 1973-86  1 9 filters, 9 
mov. av., 5 
momentum, 
1 point  
& figure 
yes partially no  + 
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Table 5. Suggested risk adjustments in assessing technical analysis' excess  
  returns 
 
Study  period 
covered 
 number of 
cases(1) 
standard of 
comparison 
risk adjustment  risk-adjusted 
excess returns 
Cornell and 
Dietrich 
(1978)(2) 
 1973-75  6 S&P 500 beta of currency with 
S&P 500 
 + 
Sweeney 
(1986) 
 1973-80  70 B&H (buy 
and hold) 
constant risk premium 
equivalent to uncov-
ered interest parity-
notation 
 + 
Taylor (1992)  1981-87  16 S&P 500 
B&H 
beta with S&P 500; 
time-varying risk pre-
mia estimated on 
AR(1) premia proc-
esses and the UIP 
 + 
+ 
Menkhoff and 
Schlumberger 
(1995) 
 1981-91  129 B&H Sharpe ratio; risk-
return-ratio of monthly 
return differences 
against B&H 
 + 
- 
Kho (1996)  1980-91  72 MSCI (in 
excess of 
one week $ 
interest ra-
tes) 
covariation of cur-
rency returns with 
world market portfolio 
excess returns 
 - 
Chang and 
Osler (1999) 
 1973-94  24 S&P 500, 
Nikkei, DAX 
Sharpe ratio with S&P 
500;  
beta with national in-
dex 
 + 
 
+ 
Neely (1997)  1974-97  40 S&P 500 Sharpe ratio;  
beta with S&P 500 
 + 
+ 
 
 
Notes:  (1)  Cases are the product of currencies times rules times models (if applicable). 
(2)  Incomplete documentation of results; favorable outcomes refer to ex post selection of 
best technical analysis rules. 
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Table 6. The use of technical analysis as a sign of temporarily suboptimal be-
haviour 
 
Hypothesis being 
tested 
 aggregated figures for chartists v. 
others 
Pearson χ2  probability
       
       
1. Chartists have 
the same age 
as other market 
participants. 
 younger than 35 years: 
 
chartists 55.56% v. 
others 49.61% 
0.645  (0.419) 
       
2. Chartists reach 
senior positions 
as often as 
other market 
participants. 
 senior positions reached: 
 
chartists 31.94% v. 
others 24.22% 
1.395  (0.237) 
       
3. Chartists have 
achieved the 
same level of 
education as 
other market 
participants. 
 university level achieved: 
 
chartists 24.64% v. 
others 32.28% 
1.254  (0.263) 
       
 
Notes:   The source is Gehrig and Menkhoff (2006), Chartists are defined as respondents who attach a 
greater weight to technical analysis than to either fundamental or flow information. The number 
of chartists according to this criterion was 72 and the number of other market participants was 
129 (exact numbers may differ slightly due to incomplete replies). The achieved university 
level compounds graduation from university as well as from university of applied sciences. 
 The χ2-test exploits not only the aggregated figures being presented here, but all available in-
formation. 
 
